Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, it is difficult for the Government to get into the position of trying to specify all the terms under which money is lent because that is likely to stifle competition and consumer choice. Our concern is to make certain that there is real transparency and we have brought in regulations to do that.
	Noble Lords will also be aware that the Competition Commission inquiry into store cards has put forward some ideas about action that might be taken including an APR warning notice, where APR exceeds a specified threshold, but that is just one of their initial suggestions.

Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, it is important that lenders behave responsibly when lending. Action has been taken to make certain that that happens. APACS is looking at ways to ensure that lenders adhere to the banking code and its best practice guidelines stop lenders lending to vulnerable people by sharing data and so on. That seems to be the way that we should deal with this issue, rather than trying to specify all the details on lending, because once one does that, one has to specify everything. If one hole is stopped up by, say, putting a cap on interest, it simply leads to action in other areas and that would not only stifle competition but would also lead to incredible bureaucracy.

Lord Jopling: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that reply. Is it not clear to everyone, including the chairman of the committee, that the code and the practice need urgently to be reviewed? When will the Government's familiar policy of dither, delay and review over a number of things end? Should we not be thinking of going further? Do the Government really think it is right that Ministers, whose behaviour causes them to resign, seem too often to go through a period of prosperous penitence and then get re-appointed to important positions in the public sector? Does the Minister agree that there would be more respect for the code and more public respect for both Parliament and politicians if the rule for Ministers who resign in these circumstances is "once out, stay out"?

Lord Tugendhat: My Lords, does the Minister agree that, though of course the Prime Minister should have complete freedom of action, no past Prime Minister has been so bereft of talent that he has been obliged to re-appoint people who have departed from his Cabinet so very soon afterwards, not once but twice?

Lord McNally: My Lords, the Minister has just given a significant reply. The noble Lord, Lord Solely, last week pontificated that this was a matter for Parliament. Will the noble Lord confirm that responsibility for the Ministerial Code is the Prime Minister's direct responsibility? That being so, he does not need the Leader of the House to tell him. The Prime Minister himself takes great pride in being the Minister responsible. Why, therefore, is the Prime Minister refusing to publish Sir Patrick Brown's report? Why is the Prime Minister rejecting the ninth report of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, which asks for an independent adviser for this code? Why is the Prime Minister refusing a Standing Committee to examine breaches of the code? Will he now admit that the problems are at the Prime Minister's door and that the noble Lord, Lord Solely was—not for the first time in his political career—wrong?

Lord Falconer of Thoroton: My Lords, some of the noble Lord's question was a bit wide of the mark. As I said in my Answer, the charter lays down existing rights; it is not a legally binding document. For example, it includes rights such everyone's right to life, which we would accept from other documents. It is perfectly sensible for the Commission to produce a document that says, "When we are thinking of legislating, we will make sure that we have complied with these fundamental rights". That is perfectly sensible and it is right that it says how it is done in every case.

Lord Chan: My Lords, would the Minister then care to explain why there is this merger of primary care trusts which will definitely save hundreds of millions of pounds and also the likely closure of a number of strategic health authorities?

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: The noble Lord should not come from Brighton; then he would understand what it means.
	Who makes the application and who responds to it? Applications for information are made by whom? What will the Government proscribe in terms of individual entries? This whole clause is riven by references to proscription of this and that, which means that we do not have in front of us all the detail, which all comes hereafter. Will the Government undertake not to allow third-party access to paragraph 9 information—the highly sensitive information referred to in paragraph 9 of the first schedule—except where expressly allowed by the Bill? Finally, what does the last phrase mean? With that, I think that I have bamboozled the Minister if I have not bamboozled everyone else. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: Although I hope that I will be as lucid as the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, would like, I confess that on my third day at the Dispatch Box, lucidity is something to which I cannot proclaim to still have hold.
	Amendment No. 141 reflects a misunderstanding of subsections (1) and (2) of Clause 8. Those subsections do not confer any power to use the card or the information on it for particular purposes. Those issues are dealt with in other parts of the Bill. Subsection (1) contains the definition of an identity card, so if a card meets the description of both paragraphs (a) and (b) of subsection (2), it is within the definition of an ID card in subsection (1) and it is therefore an ID card for the purposes of the Bill. I invite the noble Lord's attention for that purpose to Clause 43(1). It is necessary because an ID card may take a number of forms; for example, a stand-alone identity card or a document such as a resident's permit for third country nationals. It will be within the definition of an ID card if it is issued by the Secretary of State or as part of or with a designated document, so it records registrable facts and can be used to check against the information in the register.
	Amendments Nos. 142 and 143, in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, would have the effect that the ID card would not be able to contain any information of which the individual to whom the card was issued was unaware and would not be able to contain any information in an encrypted form. I assure your Lordships that we have no intention of storing identity information on the ID card that is not known to the individual. There will be some technical information on the card's chip that we do not envisage revealing in explicit detail to the individual. Such information concerns the card's security features and its ability to be read by specific card readers—and the reasons for that are absolutely clear. But that information certainly contains no additional identity information and, if I may respectfully say so, that technical data is nothing new. Such features are absolutely common in the use of credit or debit cards today and are central to how the cards function.
	The encryption of information stored on the ID card is necessary to ensure that data on the card's chip is secure and that approved readers alone are able to access it for clearly designed purposes. For example, without encryption the ID card would not meet International Civil Aviation Organisation standards for basic and enhanced access control to information on the chip of the card, and therefore would not be valid for travel. Additionally, without encryption, the possibility of implementing remote authentication technology with a potential of combating identity fraud for those using the Internet would be lost, as important technical information on the chip would be completely unprotected.
	With that lucid explanation, I hope that the noble Lord and the noble Earl will be satisfied.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I give the example of a UK national who has not been resident here for some time but has been resident in the Cayman Islands for the past 10 years. He comes back and would not fulfil the three-months residence criteria but may wish to have an ID card almost immediately before the three-months residence criteria were fulfilled. If such a person were to apply to have an ID card, although they are not entitled in the rules to have one, the provision would enable the Secretary of State to grant them one in those circumstances. The person will not be able to insist that the Secretary of State does so, but the Secretary of State may choose to do so within his discretion.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: The purpose of the amendment is to ask the Government to explain why the contract for the processing and issuing of identity cards should not be opened up to competitive tendering. Is it their firm intention that the contract will be awarded to the Passport Service or are they going to take a more businesslike approach with taxpayers' money and ensure that there is clarity and rigour in the bidding process?
	The issue was raised by the Minister's noble friend at Question Time on 7 November. The noble Lord, Lord Clarke of Hampstead, asked:
	"is my noble friend aware that the advertising that took place last week recruiting people to the Passport Office had a clear link to proof of identity? The number of jobs and the number of places for issuing such passports are the same as those envisaged in the Bill. Is it already a fait accompli in that the United Kingdom Passport Service has the job before Parliament has agreed to the card. Secondly, do we not already have a very efficient service within the Post Office that could issue these identity cards, which would bring in much-needed revenue to the Post Office and save a lot of money on new premises?"
	As ever, he was punctilious in declaring his interest as a former postman. I picked up on this and I was happy to sign up to this amendment because I noted that the Minister, while giving an answer, did not quite address all the limbs of the question. She answered by saying,
	"I join him in extolling the virtues of the Post Office"—
	charming, as ever, preceding an answer, but she said,
	"I have to say to him that it is proposed that biometric passports will come in the next year. The Passport Office is charged with delivering that part of the agenda, and, therefore, it is correct to say that it will be dealing with the biometric introduction of passports from now on".—[Official Report, 7/11/05; col. 391.]
	However, she did not answer the real question. Is it already a fait accompli that the Passport Service has the contract for processing and issuing identity cards? I have tabled this amendment to give the Minister an opportunity to answer that fully today or to say whether there is to be open competitive tendering. I beg to move.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I hope I can offer some reassurance on the nature of the planned procurement process for the identity card scheme and about the involvement of the private sector in general.
	While strategic functions and critical decision-making for the identity card scheme will necessarily remain under the control of the public sector, it is planned that where the operations of the identity card scheme can best be delivered by the private sector the Home Office will seek to procure these services from the market. Amendment No. 151 would require the Secretary of State to make a commitment on the face of the Bill to open procurement contracts for the processing and issuing of identity cards to competitive tendering. It is unnecessary to put that in the Bill as such procurement requirements are already stipulated by existing European Union legislation which sets out the procedures to be followed at each stage of the procurement process leading to the eventual award of contracts. Those procedures are based on the principles of transparency, non-discrimination and fair competition.
	In accordance with the Office of Government Commerce's best practice, the Home Office is running a number of market-sounding exercises to consult the market on our proposed procurement approach. However, the procurement process itself has yet to start, and, as I am sure noble Lords will understand, it cannot be started unless and until the Bill receives Royal Assent.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Anelay of St Johns, made reference to the question asked last week, or perhaps it was the week before, by the noble Lord, Lord Clarke of Hampstead, about the United Kingdom Passport Service's advertisements for new staff. Those advertisements for staff are not related to identity cards. I would like to make that quite clear. They cannot be related because Parliament has not yet given its authority. They relate to existing plans and proposals for the UK Passport Service to interview first-time applicants for passports which, as we have made clear in a number of our discussions, are planned to begin next year.
	As part of the planned procurement package, elements of the application and enrolment process will be conducted by the private sector. The Post Office, along with others, will be open to compete for these contracts on the basis of fulfilling the established requirements of the identity card programme—in a manner, of course, that would represent value for taxpayers' money. That is, quite rightly, how we have got to approach this.
	I am therefore happy to confirm that the Post Office will not be discriminated against in any way, shape or form. Those contracts will be open to fair competition and the Post Office, along with others, will have the opportunity, in open competition, to win those contracts on the basis of completing the requirements of the programme. I hope that that offers the reassurance that the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay of St Johns, and the noble Lord, Lord Clarke of Hampstead, seek.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: In moving Amendment No. 165, I shall speak also to Amendment No. 166. I am grateful to note that they are supported by the noble Lords, Lord Phillips and Lord Dholakia. Grouped with them are Amendments Nos. 268A and 268B, which are tabled in the names of those noble Lords. My amendments would have the effect of restricting the Secretary of State's power to require organisations to provide information to him in order to verify the information held on the national identity register. The clause deals with the provisions that the Government believe to be necessary to allow data to be shared with the Secretary of State and designated documents authorities in order that information on the register may be verified.
	In the past, I have referred to the duty under subsection (1) for a person to provide information to the Secretary of State so that an entry on the national identity register can be verified. It was part of a previous debate on another group and it is part of Clause 11(1). Clause 11(4) makes it clear that the requirement to provide information can be imposed on anyone specified in an order—for example, local government or the private sector. My amendments focus on the provisions of subsection (5) that clarify subsection (4). The Explanatory Notes tell us that the organisations or people who could fall foul of this duty could also include central government organisations and the devolved administrations in Northern Ireland and Wales. The effect of the amendments would be to exclude anyone else from falling foul of that duty.
	How do the Government intend to extend the list of those bodies that will be required to provide information to the Government? I was not reassured by the Minister's answer in another place on 14 July. He said:
	"The checks mentioned in the clause will be modest and generally limited to other Government databases, for example those of the Driver and Vehicle Licensing Agency and the Department for Work and Pensions".—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee D, 14/7/05; col. 280.]
	He went on specifically to state that the Government might wish to use the information held on credit reference agencies' databases and private databases. Can the Minister assure the Committee that information held on those databases is 100 per cent correct 100 per cent of the time? If it is not, why should that information be used to verify information on the national identity register?
	The Minister went on to say that,
	"Some private sector organisations hold pretty wide databases with up-to-date biographic information".—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee D, 14/7/05; col. 281.]
	So are the Government planning to buy into databases held by Tesco? I beg to move.

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: In referring to Clause 11(5), the noble Baroness mentioned the fact that the Scottish Executive is not on the list. I was fascinated, on reading the Bill, to note that this was probably considered to be a measure of propriety. It would be rather a cheek to compel the Scottish Executive to do anything that relates to its own affairs. How will the Secretary of State verify information held by government departments in Scotland; that is, the departments of the Scottish Executive? Does "may" mean that the Government can do that, but they do not have to? In that case, the amendment would be counterproductive so far as concerns Scotland. Alternatively, will that not happen in any case? How will facts about Scots be verified under this subsection?

Baroness Carnegy of Lour: I appreciate that point. I wonder why, when the Bill was being drafted and the Advocate-General was looking at it and trying to make it fit-in properly for Scotland, the Scottish Executive was not consulted and is not on the list. I find it slightly strange. Obviously the Scottish Executive has not yet agreed to this and so it comes under "any other person". I expect the provision will work all right but it is rather peculiar to see all the others listed but not the Scottish Executive. I certainly do not want the amendment. I accept the noble Baroness's point on that.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: My name is on the two amendments spoken to by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay. The form of words in my own amendment is exactly the same as the form of words in Clause 11, to which Amendments Nos. 162 and 163 relate. My amendment No. 268A relates to the clause dealing with the verifying of information on the register and refers to,
	"any other person who carries out functions conferred by or under an enactment that fall to be carried out on behalf of the Crown",
	Clause 39, to which my first amendment relates, has the same list in subsection (3) as the list in Clause 11(5)(a) to (d)—
	"a Minister of the Crown . . . a government department . . . a Northern Ireland department . . . the National Assembly for Wales; or"—
	but then, instead of the wording used in Clause 11(5)(e), there is a completely different formulation which is so much wider. It is not confined at all to people acting on behalf of the Crown; it could include Uncle Tom Cobbley.
	I do not see the policy justification for the difference. Both are verification clauses but Clause 39(3)(e) is as wide as the ocean; the Secretary of State could specify anybody or anything. I would be grateful if the Minister could give me the policy justification.

Lord Stoddart of Swindon: The more I have sat here and listened to the debate on these amendments, the more concerned I have become. The comparison was made with passports. The noble Lord said that you pay for a passport, after all, so why not for an identity card. As I understand it, in the first place the Minister can require people to be signed on to the national identity register and to have an ID card. That is compulsion, so far as I am concerned, but those people will presumably still have to pay for that card.
	There has been no great outcry for this Bill. People have not come forward and said desperately, "We must have an identity card". Indeed, until Ministers raised it, the discussion about it was pretty low-key. I am getting very concerned that people who eventually will be required compulsorily to have an identity card should not have to pay for it, because they are not asking for it. It will not be at their request. It is being imposed on them by Parliament, and it seems to me that if something is being imposed upon the people of this country, they should not be expected to pay individually for it.
	I am concerned that the Government have not understood what the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, and the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, have been trying to get at: that there are discrepancies in parts of the Bill, and in this part of the Bill relating to charges, that ought to be remedied. However, that gives me the opportunity reiterate my belief that when something will eventually be imposed on people, they should not be made to pay for it.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I am always delighted when there is a bit of friction between the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, and the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, because it colours proceedings. Whether it illuminates this debate, I am less certain, although I was inclined to agree with the noble Lord, Lord Peyton, in his analysis.
	I want to clarify one or two issues to put this matter finally to bed. I want to make sure that the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, understands that simple changes of address in the way that he described will not mean that there has to be a re-charging of the ID card-holder—that he will have to pay a new fee simply for notifying the register of a change of address. I also want to answer the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, because I know that he was not present at some of our earlier discussions when such questions were raised.
	There will be no open access to information on the register. Private companies will not be able to access or buy National Identity Register entries. However, with the consent of the ID card-holder, banks or other approved businesses will be able to verify identity by checking an ID card against the National Identity Register. This will mainly involve confirming that the card is valid, has not been reported lost or stolen, and that the information shown on the card is correct. It could also allow identity information not shown on the face of the card, such as address, to be provided, but, again, only—I repeat, "only"—with the consent of the card-holder.
	The card-holder's biometric may also, with his consent, be confirmed against the biometric held on the National Identity Register. However, there is an important caveat: Clause 14 specifically prevents fingerprints or other biometric information being provided from the register to a private sector organisation, even with the consent of the individual. The clause also prevents administrative information that is not related to confirming identity, such as an ID card-holder's record history, being provided to a private sector organisation again, even with the card-holder's consent.
	Clause 27 provides that transaction fees may be charged to businesses who verify identity by checking ID cards against a register, with the card-holder's consent. Information may not be provided without the card-holder's consent to any private sector organisation. So this is a tightly-constrained scheme. There will be no wholesale selling of information in the way that I think the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, envisaged.
	As to the broader questions raised by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, about there being some form of cross-subsidy within the way that the scheme operates through charging, I made it clear that the scheme must pay for itself, but it cannot profit over and above that. I will give some further thought to the points that he made in that discussion, because I believe that we should do so and that he has raised an interesting issue. But I am not sure that anything further can be gained from it. I will reflect on his comments, but I think that they are based on a misapprehension in part.
	Having heard that further elucidation, the noble Earl may feel slightly better informed and able to withdraw his amendment.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I am very grateful to the noble Baroness. I thought for one moment that she was suggesting that she might have reached an age where she would be so entitled, and I just simply did not believe it. That was why I was registering such shock. Lawyers are known for their inventive minds, but the noble Lord's ingenious construction on Clause 15(3)(a) even beggared my belief. I will say why.
	Clause 15 provides a power to link the identity cards scheme with the provision of public services. The clause reflects one of the objectives of the identity cards scheme; namely, to simplify the checks on eligibility for services and to reduce fraudulent use of services. The clause contains a number of safeguards. The effect of subsection (2) is that payments provided under an enactment—for example, social security benefits—and public services provided free of charge may not be made conditional on the production of an ID card prior to the cardholder being the subject of a Clause 6 compulsion order. I understand that the noble Baroness and the noble Lord are content that that should be the position, but they wish to press it further.
	Subsection (3) expressly provides that Clause 15 does not enable regulations to be made, which would require an individual to carry an ID card with him at all times, or to produce an ID card, other than in the context of applying for a public service. I would like to make clear that our interpretation is consistent with that which the noble Lord assumed; namely, that the person does not have to carry the ID card with him. The subsection (3) safeguards continue to apply whether or not a person is subject to compulsory registration.
	The effect of Amendment No. 188 would be that regulations making the provision of a public service conditional on the production of an ID card would have to allow for other evidence of identity to be used instead. The result would be that less secure forms of identity could be used, which would impact on the scope for reducing fraudulent use of public services.
	Securing the efficient and effective provision of public services is one of the aims of the scheme, as I have already said. This would be undermined if individuals were able to access them by the production of a document that was less secure than the ID card. It would be clear that fraudsters and individuals not entitled to access public services would naturally be attracted to using the less secure documents as a means of attempting to "prove" their entitlement to use them.
	When individuals present themselves at, for example, a DWP office and make an application for benefits, it must be right that they prove their identity before they receive the public service. The issue of entitlement to receive benefits will rest with the Department for Work and Pensions. The ID card scheme will enable individuals to prove that they are who they say they are, as well as other registrable facts, such as nationality and residential status, which may have an impact on their entitlement to use the service they have applied for.
	We will, of course, ensure that individuals who have lost their ID cards or who have had them damaged or stolen will not be disadvantaged. Individuals will be able to give their national identity register number, along with a biometric, for their identity to be verified. Furthermore, in the context of the National Health Service, to which both noble Lords referred, no one requiring emergency medical care will be denied treatment. We have always made clear that emergency treatment will never be denied to any person, regardless of their circumstances.
	Amendments Nos. 189 and 190 extend the limitation in Clause 15(2). Amendment No. 189 would extend subsection 2(a) so that it covered not only payments received under an enactment but payments made under an enactment. Amendment No. 190 would extend subsection (2) (b) so that it covered not just public services that are free of charge but those that are subsidised.
	The safeguards in Clause 15(2) are intended to strike a balance between the considerable benefits that will be derived from the links between ID cards and public services and the need, prior to compulsion, to ensure that certain fundamental services, such as healthcare and social security will not be dependent on the production of an ID card. The clause strikes the right balance.
	Amendments Nos. 189 and 190 would in practice mean that, prior to compulsion, no meaningful link could be made between ID cards and any form of public service. For example, regulations could not require people applying for a firearms certificate to produce an ID card, as a payment is required. In his eloquent speech, the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, raised NHS entitlement. He used the example of a prescription, which is partly funded, as did the noble Baroness. We could also use the example of dental treatment, which is also partly funded. Although Amendment No. 190 would prevent regulations under Clause 15 making the provision of NHS dental or medical treatment conditional on the production of the ID card, I can confirm that, in advance of compulsion, we are not actively pursuing placing such a requirement on individuals.
	Amendment No. 191 would amend Clause 15(3)(a) to state that no regulations could be made to require an individual to carry an ID card at any time. As I said, that amendment is unnecessary, as the Bill already prevents the making of regulations requiring individuals to carry identity cards with them at all times. However, once compulsion has been introduced, there will be occasions on which individuals may be required to produce their ID cards to access a public service. The amendment would directly contradict the requirement in Clause 15(1). For that reason, we cannot accept it.
	Unlike the other amendments in the group, that amendment does not tighten Clause 15. Rather, it removes the second of the safeguards in subsection (3): preventing regulations from requiring the production of an ID card other than in connection with an application for a public service. That safeguard goes hand in hand with a safeguard against requirements to carry. A safeguard on carrying would be rendered meaningless if there were countless situations in which the production of an identity card was mandatory. Therefore, Clause 15(3)(b) provides that there may be no such requirements other than those that relate to public services for which the person concerned has applied. That prohibition, like the prohibition on requirements to carry the card, continues to apply even after it is compulsory to register.
	I hope, therefore, that the noble Lord will accept that Amendment No. 191 is not necessary. If Clause 15(3)(a) read "at any time", it would conflict with the requirement that the card must be produced on application for a public service. I do not think that we need it. Read together, paragraphs (a) and (b) of Clause 15(3) mean that you can be required to carry the card only to the extent that you are required to produce it. That extent is clearly set out. If read together, they make sense and give the noble Lord what he seeks. They get the balance about right.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I have tried to be clear that we are not actively pursuing this. We have dealt with the free provision of services. We are all agreed that that is appropriate. We have looked at the issues around prescriptions and understand the basis of that, as we also understand it in relation to dental treatment. For that reason, we will not actively pursue that provision, particularly in respect of compulsion.
	Moreover, Clause 18(1) prohibits requirements for an ID card being made unless the exemption in 18(2) applies. We believe, therefore, that the combination of those two provisions enables us to provide a reassurance on this point. Clause 18(2) states:
	"Each of the following is a case in which such a condition or requirement may be imposed in relation to or on an individual—
	(a) where the condition or requirement is imposed in accordance with regulations under section 15, or in accordance with provision made by or under any other enactment;
	(b) where provision is made allowing the individual to satisfy the condition or other requirement using reasonable alternative methods of establishing his identity;
	(c) where the individual is of a description of individuals who are subject to compulsory registration".
	I hope that I have been able to reassure noble Lords on this. It is clear that at this early stage we do not wish to be unnecessarily restrictive by ruling it out entirely. Over time the identity card will become the gold standard way of proving identity throughout the United Kingdom. We are clear that, as well as providing a more convenient means of access for those entitled to services, the identity card will also help to prevent unauthorised access to them. However, use of the cards for devolved services such as health and education is a matter for the devolved administrations. But it will mean that the whole of the UK will be covered. I say that in anticipation of questions from the noble Baroness, who has been anxious to confirm whether I am referring to England and Wales, or to Scotland and Northern Ireland as well.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: I am grateful to the noble Baroness for her question, to which the answer is yes. Clause 1(3) is the most troublesome subsection in the whole Bill. As I said both at Second Reading and on the first day in Committee, it is drafted in an extremely obscure way. I think that I did table an amendment to take out the word "ascertained", but I cannot be certain.
	Clause 17 is very important. As worded, there appears to be no restriction on someone asking the national identity card register for information under paragraph 9 of Schedule 1. Data under that paragraph is jealously protected elsewhere in the Bill, but is not protected at all here. That is another reason why these amendments are both necessary and good.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: As usual, I am grateful to the Minister for that full explanation. A number of issues arise from it—I think we all agree that this is a complicated clause—and I should like to start with the question of amendments to Clause 1. I did table an amendment to Clause 1 and, if reference is made to Hansard, I think you will find that I expatiated at length upon the inadequacies of subsection (3)(b). But let us not get bogged down with that.
	The Minister said that there will be regulations in relation to Clause 17 but I do not think that we should allow access to paragraph 9 data unless it is specified on the face of the Bill. In all other parts of the Bill the Government have taken great care to say when there will and when there will not be access to the highly-sensitive data in paragraph 9. The Government need to let the Committee know whether or not they intend, or contemplate, making regulations that will give public service providers access to paragraph 9 information and, if so, what provisions the regulations will contain. Otherwise we should put something in this clause about that.
	My ears pricked up when the Minister referred to the police finding fingerprints at the scene of a crime and using the ascertainment limb of the clause to obtain information. Does that mean that the police will be able to provide the national identity card register with a fingerprint and check whether anyone on the register has a matching fingerprint?
	If it does, I had not realised that the clause went that far and it excites rather than satisfies my anxieties about it. It is something that I shall want to think about and no doubt colleagues on the Conservative Benches will want to contemplate the matter rather carefully.
	The first point that caught my ear when the Minister was speaking was her reference to the convenience to the citizen of information being ascertainable rather than verifiable under this clause. I am not sure my question is fair, but I have no option because the wording of Clause 17 (1) is so extraordinarily obscure. It states:
	"The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision authorising a person providing a public service",
	but the person providing a public service cannot be an individual can they?

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I am rather disappointed by the response from the noble Lord, Lord Bassam. I appreciate that it is the Government's intention that the system should not overall be applied in any discriminatory way. I am aware that the Minister thinks that the amendment it is not necessary or desirable, but my argument is that it is necessary to have clarity on the issue.
	This is an enabling Bill in a very rough form at the moment. I am also aware that, when noble Lords approached Second Reading we were sent briefings that showed that organisations such as the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants believed that there had not been a full race equality impact assessment. I raised that issue at Second Reading and the Minister was very kind in a letter that she wrote afterwards to address some of my concerns, but the feeling remained that sufficient attention had not been given to the race equality impact assessment throughout the Bill. As a result of that, I looked at an amendment that had been tabled in another place by my honourable and right honourable friends and felt that that too had not addressed the full range of those who might feel that they could be discriminated against when required to produce their ID cards. I feel that it is the production of the cards that could lead to difficulties with discrimination. Therefore, given the briefings that I have been given, I remain dissatisfied with the courteous and I am sure well-intentioned response from the Minister. It is with no great pleasure that I feel that I must test the opinion of the Committee.

On Question, Whether the said amendment (No. 194) shall be agreed to?
	Their Lordships divided: Contents, 105; Not-Contents, 120

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: Amendments Nos. 203 and 209 are also grouped with this amendment. I suspect we are on broadly the same territory as we were with the last group of amendments, and I anticipate that the Minister will say in other words what she has just said. To put it briefly, there is a general argument that was advanced at Second Reading, and many times since, about the scope of this Bill as originally intended and the scope of the register.
	There has been function creep. It is fair to remember that when David Blunkett first stood up in the House of Commons and said that we were going to have national identity cards, he put it on a minimalist basis. We now have an identity card that cannot by any means be described in that way. I, along with my colleagues on these Benches—and this concern is shared widely—do not want to see this register and the information on it used for any but the most essential purposes. I briefly remind the Committee that in Clause 1, the key clause, one of the tests of something "necessary in the public interest" is:
	"for the purposes of the prevention or detection of crime"—
	any crime. The most basic, simple criminal act, such as a road traffic offence, is strictly within the purview of this Bill.
	I understand that issues of serious crime and national security should be within its purview, but, wherever possible and sensible, I want it confined to those categories when we get around to clauses like Clause 19, which, without the consent of the individual concerned, entitles the Secretary of State to share information on the register—including paragraph 9 information, in the case of serious crime—with the agencies enumerated in Clause 19(2).
	Amendment No. 203 refers to Clause 19(4), which entitles the tax authorities and Customs to have access to the information, apart from paragraph 9 information. I do not see why there should be any allowance for the tax authorities and Customs and Revenue to have access to any of that information without the consent of the citizen, other than for, as I have put it,
	"the interests of national security or for the prevention or detection of serious crime".
	I shall be interested to hear the Government's justification for giving them those much wider powers.
	Finally, in Clause 19(7), I again want a limitation to be made on the power of the Secretary of State under that subsection to only those matters of national security or the prevention or detection of serious crime—remembering that serious crime is defined by reference to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, which, it is fair to say, is a good working definition of what most people think to be serious crime. I beg to move.

The Earl of Erroll: Funnily enough, I disagree slightly on the matter of serious crime. I would prefer to see something like "crimes against the person". Most of the public want to feel that they are safe walking around the streets, that they are safe at night, and that you catch the burglars, the muggers, the murderers and rapists. The public would feel that there was some genuine use for this legislation as regards that sort of thing. To many people, serious crime tends to be the big crimes, the big gangs and so on. If it was useful for crimes against the person, I do not think the public would have any problems with releasing their information to the police if it was going to help clear up those sorts of things.
	We come, therefore, to the real purpose of the ID card. It is certainly not what has been published; we have dealt with that already. The purpose is for the commissioners of Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs to be able to track things. This is what really worries me. I think the purpose is to be able to track money. At the moment, we have a very high tax regime. We know there are lot of people out there perhaps not complying exactly with all the things they should be, and that there is a large grey economy. Isabelle and I have always been careful about this. Having a title, you have to be careful, as sooner or later you will be investigated. I have been investigated twice in the past, merely because they could not believe a Lord was as poor as I was. Actually, I asked for it the second time around.
	The trouble is that this will be applied selectively. When HMRC decides that it wants to investigate someone, it can do a trawl in connection with that investigation to try to find out what else is happening. If you are one of the unlucky ones within whatever percentage it is of those under investigation, it is going to get you, because very few people out there can remember everything they have paid for in cash and so on.
	If HMRC is to be given this sort of powers, that has to go hand in glove with rationalising whatever forces the grey economy to exist. Therefore, the tax system and other areas must be reviewed so that they do not bear unfairly on those who, by lottery, are picked out for investigation. That is why I would like to see this part of the Bill suppressed until there is a fairer system that would not give rise to unfair investigations into those who are picked out. Paragraphs (a) to (f) should be left out at this stage. When there is a review of the tax system that is fairer, maybe we should consider putting them in—but not yet.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Errol, for not agreeing with the amendment. I think that the amendment is unnecessary and that the Bill is already in the correct state. I shall describe why.
	I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hylton, and try to reassure him, that we are not seeking to chisel away at civil liberties. There is no intention to cause alarm. Indeed, we hope that much of that which we produce in this Bill will be reassuring and helpful and will enable us to help our citizens to feel more secure and far less alarmed and to deal with a number of the issues that have concerned them. I shall not go through all the reasons that were set out so convincingly at Second Reading.
	Amendment No. 201 would amend Clause 19(3)(b) and restrict the provision of information to the police for the prevention or detection of crime to cases of "serious" crime. That would not be appropriate.
	Paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 information—that is, the audit trail—can be provided only in cases of serious crime. But it would not be appropriate to limit the provision of all the identity and application history information on the register in this way. We went through in detail last time why we thought it was appropriate for the audit trail to be so restricted. For example, if the police were investigating someone who had a collection of identity cards or passports in different names in his possession with a view to establishing whether an offence under Clause 27(5) had been committed, if the amendment were agreed to, the police could not apply for information from the register to verify the entries without the consent of those concerned, because the maximum penalty for possession of documents belonging to another without reasonable excuse is two years. That would not fall into the category of "serious crime". I am fairly confident that the noble Lord would agree that that would be ridiculous, because it would not be able to do that which we would expect to do on behalf of the public.
	I turn to the matter raised by the noble Earl, Lord Errol, in relation to robbery. If there were true investigations into shoplifting or street robbery, that, too, may not fall within the definition of serious crime; and yet it must be right that we use the information that we have to be able to identify and pursue those who have been guilty of committing criminal offences to the detriment of others and who have victimised decent members of the community in that way.
	Amendment No. 203 would limit the provision of information without consent to the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs to circumstances where that information was necessary in the interests of national security or for the prevention and detection of serious crime. It is implicit in regard to all the other proper pursuits of HMRC that it would be disabled from using any information on the register.
	Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs has law enforcement responsibilities, often undertaken jointly with the police, but it is also directly involved in the prevention and detection of crime. The Customs side is responsible for the investigation and prosecution of crime including major cases of drug trafficking. The Revenue side also has an important role in law enforcement. We do not think that they should be impeded from discharging their duties appropriately.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: It is a serious crime, but your Lordships will also know that taking drugs from one country to another, sometimes secreted in the body, can be at the lower end of drug trafficking. There is a huge issue as to whether such people would or would not be included. Many of the offences that HMRC pursues go right across the full spectrum. The noble Lord would be saying that you could investigate the serious end of crime whereas the other end—a point raised by the noble Earl, Lord Errol, who restricted it to offences against the person—would not be prosecuted. Those offences are often seen as equally important—and sometimes more important because they impinge on more people's lives—by the ordinary person in the street.
	Clause 19(4) is necessarily detailed to ensure that all the relevant functions of HMRC are covered so that it will be possible to provide it with information from the national identity register to assist with its functions; for example, in directing its compliance work effectively and reducing the risk of making payments to individuals who have made fraudulent claims. In addition, the boundary between the civil and criminal work of HMRC is a complex area. Disruption of revenue fraud to prevent significant tax loss developing is a key element of the strategy for combating commercial fraud; for example, value added tax and duty on tobacco, oils and alcohol.
	Although it is possible to arrest and prosecute the perpetrators, part of the response in tackling serious tax fraud may be the use of civil procedures to frustrate criminals and prevent loss of revenue. For example, in "missing trader" VAT fraud, where fraudulent VAT repayment claims can amount to millions of pounds, HMRC may use civil procedures to recover the loss of tax. These civil procedures, which can be more effective than criminal proceedings in recovering funds, may include restraint orders where a debt has been established, the appointment of an insolvency practitioner or civil conspiracy proceedings.
	What links these civil disruption activities to criminal investigation is that both require timely and accurate intelligence for effective action to be taken. It makes sense then that the Revenue and Customs can be provided with information held on the national identity register that could help in its investigations regardless of whether it leads to a criminal prosecution. There are also good reasons why we should not limit the provision of this information to "serious" crime. Revenue and Customs deals with child benefit and tax credit fraud. An individual instance of these types of fraud may not appear to be a serious crime but it could be part of a serious organised fraud, and cumulatively these cases where false identities are used could lead to a major loss to public funds. I cannot speak about any ongoing cases, but, as your Lordships will know, at this moment a number of issues are being discussed in the press about the impact of such purported activity.
	Of course, as I have said before, we are not talking of wholesale access to information. We are talking about basic identity details being provided. The Bill already provides that information in paragraph 9 of Schedule 1—the audit trail information which we spent a long time discussing—can be provided only in cases of serious crime. Detailed rules will be laid down in secondary legislation under Clause 23 as to exactly how any request for information to be provided to Revenue and Customs is to be handled.
	Amendment No. 209 would remove the public interest test in Clause 19(7) and limit the Secretary of State to making regulations and orders under the powers in the clause only when necessary in the interests of national security or for the prevention or detection of serious crime, rather than in the public interest as defined in Clause 1(4). Subsection (7) provides a safeguard on the use of the powers by the Secretary of State under subsections (3)(c), (4)(f) and (5) to allow provision of information from the register to the police, Revenue and Customs and government departments for specified purposes. Subsection (7) confines the exercise of those powers to cases in which it is necessary in the public interest as defined in Clause 1(4). Clause 19(3) and (4) already provides power to provide information to the police and Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs for the purposes of national security and prevention and detection of crime, so it would not make sense to limit the order-making powers to those purposes.
	The order and regulation-making powers under Clause 19 are the subject of the next group of amendments, but the circumstances in which the police, Revenue and Customs and government authorities may legitimately require verification information without an individual's consent are not limited to the prevention and detection of serious crime or national security. To limit the provision of information without consent in that fashion would be to limit the usefulness of the identity cards scheme. For example, the power in Clause 19(3)(c) may be used to authorise the provision of information to the police for the purposes of identifying victims of accidents, terrorist incidents or disaster. Regrettably, we all know how necessary that has proven to be on occasion, when one has not been able to identify the person in any other way. The power to provide information to government departments under Clause 19(5) may be used to provide information—for example, to the Department for Work and Pensions for benefits entitlement purposes.
	We do not accept that the public interest definition is too far-reaching, because it includes,
	"the efficient and effective provision of public services".
	Providing information to help a public authority to tackle housing benefit fraud, for example, or to identify someone attempting to access services to which they are not entitled surely goes to the heart of the benefits of the scheme. Such information should be available without consent.
	I hope that the Committee will accept that the information held on the national identity register is held in confidence and, as I hope that I have made clear in all our debates, there will be no open access to the register. I was pleased that the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, was able to remind us of that fact earlier in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Hylton. No one will be able to simply browse through the entries on the register. As I have said, regulations under Clause 23 would govern how any request for information would be handled, by whom it could be made and by whom it would need to be authorised. The order-making powers to prescribe additional purposes for which information may be provided to the police, the Revenue and government departments are subject to the public interest test in subsection (7) and to the scrutiny of Parliament.
	I shall answer the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lyell. Of course regulations under Clause 23(5) may allow information to be provided to an officer of a lower rank than the chief constable of the police. The regulations will make different provisions depending on the nature of the information, and a higher rank will be needed for paragraph 9 information. We think that proper.
	Following the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, I have indicated that I am willing to look again at the powers and make them subject to the affirmative rather than the negative resolution procedure. I will return to the matter on Report. I agree with Members of the Committee who say that that would be an appropriate level of scrutiny.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I understand the noble Lord's anxiety, but it is not justified in this case. We rely on the efficacy, integrity and efficiency that has been demonstrated—not hoped for, but demonstrated—by the passport office. If I may respectfully say so, he has been around long enough to know that that was not always the case in relation to the passport office. We had real challenges to get the system right and the technology working properly, but we have a sound organisation with an excellent record of delivery and security that has not yet let us down.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: No apology is necessary, not least because the noble Lord spoke to his amendments so expeditiously. All the amendments narrow the grounds on which information can be provided without consent, on a basis very similar to those advanced under the previous group of amendments. I had hoped that I had been able to persuade noble Lords, although I understand that I may not have, that the national identity register will be held in confidence and will not be open to access.
	Much has been said about it being a new agency. Of course it will be, but it will be predicated on the foundations of the agency that we already have. It will cover much of the information that we already hold securely in relation to the 80 per cent of the people in our country who currently have a passport. I need to reassure noble Lords that we are not talking about totally different information. That information, albeit held through passports, is currently accessed from time to time in a way that is proper. The change will add biometric data to the register, but the fundamental information held in relation to many people will not be very different.
	It is right and proper that information held on the register should be provided to the police and the security services when required for purposes spelt out in Clause 19. Clause 202 would remove the ability to specify in an order any additional purposes. I hope that noble Lords recognise that the police undertake work that falls outside the definitions of the detection of crime or in the interests of national security. For example, there could be circumstances when there is a wider service to the public that would require the police to be able to verify information from the national identity register. The power could be used, for example, to identify a body after an accident where there is no other means of identification or to help trace a missing, vulnerable person who may be in danger because of a medical condition. These situations may be considered good enough reasons to allow information to be provided from the register without consent. Earlier, I mentioned the tragic circumstances on 7 July. We had to identify people. If those people could not be identified in any other way, being able to use the data for that reason would be a mercy to family and friends, who would be desperate for identification.
	Amendment No. 204 would prevent the provision of information to Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (HMRC) for other purposes specified by order, and limit it to those specified in paragraphs (a) to (e) of subsection (4). Subsection (4) of Clause 19 was drafted in a detailed fashion to ensure that all the relevant functions of the new HMRC were covered. Subsection (4)(f) is still required to give the flexibility to allow the circumstances listed to be extended in line with additional work which might be allocated to this still new department. Remember, we are not talking of wholesale access to information; we are talking about basic identity details being provided. The rules under Clause 23 will allow, as I have already reminded the Committee, detailed rules to be laid down in the secondary legislation about how any such request for information to be provided to HMRC will be handled.
	Amendment No. 205 would prevent regulations being made that would permit a government department, including a Northern Ireland government department, to be provided with information for the purposes specified in that order. The provision of identity information from the register to other government departments is a vital part of the identity card scheme and will enable many of the benefits to be realised. It is worth remembering that this subsection does not authorise the provision of information within paragraph 9 of Schedule 1. We envisage these regulations being used, for example, to make provision for the Department for Work and Pensions to receive information connected to its functions in investigating benefit fraud. It could also be used to make provision for information to be provided to the Department for Constitutional Affairs for the enforcement of fines. We have spoken often in this House about the problems of enforcement. Usually, the two things one needs for enforcement are correct name and address. They make all the difference.
	The order-making powers in Clause 19 are strictly limited. Any order or regulation would need to specify the public functions for which any information could be provided from the register, and subsection (7) provides that the powers can only be used to authorise provision of information where it is necessary in the public interest. Any statutory instruments made under these powers will be subject to parliamentary scrutiny. I am therefore pleased to respond to Amendments Nos. 206 and 207, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Phillips of Sudbury, which seek to make the Secretary of State's powers to prescribe the functions of another government department or Northern Ireland, department that would warrant provision of information subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
	The amendments mirror a recommendation of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee in their recent report. As I have said before, we have looked at that report and are inclined to agree with their recommendation in this respect. With noble Lords' consent, I shall return to this matter after further thought on Report.
	Amendment No. 208 would remove the ability to provide information to a designated documents authority without consent. The provision in Clause 19(6) is included for good reason. In the future we may designate a different category of document that would not be issued by the new agency or come under the responsibility of my right honourable friend the Home Secretary, or any of his successors—for example, a driving licence issued by DVLA or Driver and Vehicle Licensing Northern Ireland. This power would ensure that the agency was able to have the same information provided to it, and that all ID cards would be issued in a uniform manner.
	I hope that I have explained fully why the measures we seek are proportionate and necessary, and meet the needs of the circumstances. I therefore invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I am grateful to all noble Lords who have taken part in the debate on this group of amendments, which probe further the way in which the audit trail will be operated, and the powers we are giving to the Secretary of State through this clause. I am grateful to the Minister for taking the time to look at the impact of each amendment individually.
	I immediately see the force of the Minister's argument on Amendment No. 202, with the identification of victims of crime. We in this House agreed earlier this year with the Government's proposals to ensure that DNA could be used—for example, in identifying those who tragically lost their lives in the tsunami. That is not a new argument, and one we accept wholeheartedly. The difficulty is that one has to balance, on one side, the Government's requirement to be flexible in being able to later add further powers, as against an understanding of what may be appropriate and acceptable—as the Minister says—for the Government so to do.
	I certainly welcome the fact that the Government—as the Minister said earlier, to a group of my amendments—are prepared to accept the recommendations of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee to ensure that the orders within this clause will be by affirmative resolution. I certainly hope that that would mean that the Government could be held to account.
	I will have to look carefully at the Minister's answer, however, because I still feel that, on Amendment No. 208, we are leaving open a very wide gate for the Government to drive through changes. It may well be that, having read her arguments and spoken to her further between now and Report stage, I may be satisfied. However, these are probing amendments, and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Phillips of Sudbury: It has not made me rich. Quite seriously, however, it is a real hole in the UK tax bucket. I know from my professional experience that there is a great deal of activity that would not withstand the scrutiny of light. It makes me think that the issue of reciprocity is not a throwaway matter at all. I understand the point that they do not have an identity card scheme, but they have passports. If, as the noble Baroness has constantly pressed upon us, the passport system is the rock upon which this modest edifice is to be added, then surely we should at least get some reciprocity on those lines. I should imagine that the Inland Revenue, not to mention the serious crimes office, might well occasionally get great benefit from the factual footprint that is available on a passport.

Lord Rooker: My Lords, the main purpose of the draft order is to introduce a safety certification scheme for sports grounds in Northern Ireland. It will improve the safety of spectators at sports grounds. In Northern Ireland, unlike in Great Britain, there are no arrangements requiring owners, occupiers or managers of outdoor sports grounds actively to consider the safety of spectators. District councils and the Health and Safety Agency for Northern Ireland have found it difficult to enforce existing legislation on spectator safety as it primarily relates to employers and/or employees. One of the difficulties they have sometimes encountered has been the identification of the employer.
	Many noble Lords will be aware that, in Great Britain, existing legislation such as the Safety of Sports Ground Act 1975 and the Fire Safety and Safety of Places of Sport Act 1987, which followed the disastrous Bradford fire, were acted upon and enforced by local authorities under the leadership and guidance of the Football Licensing Authority, which was established by the Football Spectators Act 1989. However, Northern Ireland was not included in that legislation. Today, by bringing the draft order before the House, we will be introducing new safety standards for spectators at all sports grounds, not just Association Football, and bringing Northern Ireland into line with legislation already on the statute book for the rest of Great Britain.
	The aim of the legislation is to introduce a safety certification scheme for grounds with a capacity of more than 5,000 spectators and for spectator stands with a capacity of more than 500. It is estimated that about 26 sports grounds and 15 spectator stands will require certificates. I delineate between the two. For example, race courses and the motor racing circuit would not of themselves as a ground be liable for certification, because they are vast wide-open spaces. However, a spectator stand of more than 500 would be covered.
	The order, if approved, will give district councils the authority to issue safety certificates, enforce the terms and conditions of those certificates and ensure that owners, occupiers or managers are responsible for the safety of their organisation. An overseeing body will be established to provide advice and guidance. Consultation on the draft order confirmed general support for these proposals, including support from district councils.
	Subject to the order being approved by the House, it will go to the Privy Council early next year. It will come into force 12 months after it is approved, but some of the provisions will come into force straight away, one of which is the ability of local authorities to issue a prohibition notice on what they would consider unsafe grounds. There is a year to get the house in order, but if there is something really serious the local authorities will get that order straight away on the grounds of public safety.
	So I commend the order to your Lordships' House as an opportunity to improve the safety of spectators while visiting the many sports grounds throughout Northern Ireland. I beg to move.

Lord Laird: My Lords, I thank the Minister for outlining the order. The group with which I am identified support it. I offer congratulations to everybody who has been involved in putting this together. It is long overdue, but something that is long overdue is still very welcome.

Lord Rooker: My Lords, I am very grateful for the obviously widespread support that the order has received. I fully accept that it is long overdue and that it is better late than never. It is fortunate that there has not been a major tragedy in Northern Ireland. The order has been consulted on.
	On the noble Baroness's questions, the term "reasonable" is included throughout our legislation. It would be wrong for a district council to impose an unreasonable requirement on a sports ground because they would have grounds for complaining about it if it was thought to be unreasonable. There would be an appeals system. All reasonable precautions should be taken. Some people may be required to do some work as a result of this. We all know what the reasonable precautions will be: crash barriers, entrances and so on, and perhaps the formulation of the stands. But it will be wholly reasonable. They will not be asked to do anything in Northern Ireland that people in Great Britain have not been asked to do.
	That brings me to the second part of the noble Baroness's question. The provision is not identical because it suits Northern Ireland, but, for all practical purposes, it brings Northern Ireland legislation into line with what exists now in Great Britain. A regulatory impact assessment has been carried out. The Government have estimated that it will cost about £30 million over the next 10 years to bring the major sports grounds in Northern Ireland into line with the proposed new order. A start has been made. Already £9 million is being provided over the next three years to assist the sports council implement a new stadia safety programme.
	The main objective of the Sports Council scheme is to address the long-term spectator safety deficiencies at major grounds. The grounds in Northern Ireland vary enormously in size. There are not many of the very large ones. The stadia safety scheme is a strategic programme and encourages sports to adopt a strategic approach to improving the safety at grounds.
	I know that this was not covered by the regulatory impact assessment, but turning to the Explanatory Memorandum at Paragraph 11, it has been difficult to quantify the costs, but the department estimates the following. The cost to individual clubs will be £1,150; the cost to a district council for a safety certificate will be £200,000 to £362,000 and the cost to the department for running it £90,000 per annum, overheads not included. There will be a charge for these certificates in due course. That will be enunciated by the department.
	I have a more specific answer. Is this identical to legislation in the UK? The answer is yes. For all practical purposes, I said the same.

Lord Bach: I am grateful to the noble Lord and the noble Baroness for their comments. They are both obviously experts in this field. I was very impressed by the noble Lord's exact knowledge of these not-short regulations. He asked about the date on which they would come into force, which, as he said, would be the day after these regulations are made. That will be the day after the conclusion of debates in both Houses. If these regulations are fortunate enough to be agreed today, that will mean, tomorrow.
	The noble Lord asked about problems at the retail end. Retailers have the largest share of obligation under the regulations—some 48 per cent—and have played a full part in increasing packaging waste recovery and recycling so far, which is up by some 25 percentage points since 1998. There will be higher costs—an extra £19 million spread over the next three years—compared with the costs that were estimated in 2003. It has been necessary to amend the targets to ensure that we will achieve the next directive targets. In the great scheme of things, £19 million is not a huge extra cost, but it is an extra cost.
	The noble Baroness referred to reducing packaging. Obligations based on packaging are handled by the business. Therefore, if it reduces the amount of packaging it handles, the costs of compliance will be lower. So if it gets less packaging in, its costs will be less, which is, no doubt, part of the virtuous cycle that the noble Baroness referred to. She also talked about potato and maize starches. She is right that they can be used to make packaging, but biodegradable is really beneficial only if it is sent for biodegrading itself, otherwise, it goes straight into household waste. The noble Baroness also referred to the audit trail. Importantly, the Environment Agency monitors and enforces these regulations, so we are comfortable that there is a proper audit trail for these matters.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: In that case, the noble Lord will not get a clean sweep, which I believed we might have succeeded in giving him. Amendment No. 211A would remove the power to provide information from the Register for the purpose of facilitating a determination of whether criminal investigations or criminal proceedings should be initiated or brought to an end in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. We do not believe that that is right.
	In our view that it is necessary to retain the power to provide information under Section 17(2)(d) of the Anti-terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001. For example, if a foreign prosecuting authority has arrested a British citizen on suspicion of an offence but our British citizen maintains that he was still in the UK when the offence took place, if information from the Register would prove that he was indeed within the UK on the date in question, surely we would want to provide that information to the authority holding him in order to effect his release.
	That situation is not covered by Section 17(2)(d) because until the authority abroad knows whether the alibi is genuine, it cannot decide whether to initiate proceedings or, if they have already begun, to bring them to an end. The measure has a practical and not insignificant purpose.
	I take up a point made earlier—Clause 20(1)(b) is expressly subject to compliance with regulations under Clause 23. It is not covered by Section 17(2)(c). I have already explained why Section 17(2)(d) is needed.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I beg to move Amendment No. 214 standing in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Crickhowell.
	Clause 21 will allow the Secretary of State to tell somebody who is not the subject of the information that something recorded about an individual is inaccurate or incomplete; and it will allow him to tell that unspecified third party that the information on the register is inaccurate or incomplete without even letting the subject of the information himself or herself know either that the information is inaccurate or incomplete or that the Secretary of State has told somebody else that the information is inaccurate or incomplete. Why should this be so? We say that the Secretary of State should notify the person who is the subject of the information in writing that he has taken such action within 30 days of taking that action. The period of 30 days has been plucked out of the air as a reasonable one. If the Government propose another more reasonable period, I could be persuaded to accept it.
	If the Government are not minded to look kindly on my amendment—and something tells me that they may not—they should explain what kind of information may be held on the register about me that is likely to be inaccurate or incomplete and which it would be in the public interest that I should not know about. I beg to move.

Lord Selsdon: The noble Baroness kindly mentioned one of my favourite subjects which is emergency services and the data available to them, particularly as in a few years time we will have Galileo and all forms of GPS for communication. An identity base could be very helpful to the individual—though I oppose it in principle for others. For example, it could be useful for identifying blood groups, those who need particular medicines and those who suffer from particular diseases. Within that field no individual would feel concerned about making that data available. I had thought of raising this issue on Report. The Minister may consider a particular section for the emergency services where people could voluntarily provide life-saving data that could be available in the event of, say, a car crash or major disaster. Individuals could be identified and the relevant emergency or health data would be available.

Lord Lucas: When the register is up and running, it will potentially be an extremely important source of information for all kinds of research purposes. We will have a fairly complete log of people's movements around the UK. We will also have a much better picture of what the local population of the UK is at any particular time than is provided by rather out of date and occasional censuses. If you are trying to look at the pattern of provision in an area or, indeed, the pattern of take-up of any other service in an area, this is going to be an extremely important data resource—either by itself, or in conjunction with other databases which will then be linked with it.
	I do not expect—and it would not be usual—for data to be released which would allow individuals to be identified, which is the point of my use of the word "dissociated". I do not lay any particular claim to the accuracy of the wording of this. If there is a prohibition on providing data under any circumstances from the register for research purposes, which is the way I read the Bill at the moment, then we are going to miss an enormous opportunity for understanding our island better and providing services better.
	At the end of the day, the Government, wonderful though they are, do not have all the best researchers and statisticians. Going back to my own history, that was one of the tragedies of the BSE episode: the Ministry of Agriculture had some very good statisticians but they just never asked the right questions. When we eventually released the data, it took about two months for Imperial College to tell us what had been happening. They were looking at it a different way. There were fresh minds on the same data. Even the limited data which will be held here, particularly under Schedule 1(1), is going to be extremely valuable. It is important that that should be available to genuine researchers.
	The other aspect is Schedule 1(2). If you are seeking to defend someone in a court case against the matching of their face with an image taken by a high-resolution camera, then you are going to need to be able to understand the technicalities of that matching: how it works, under what circumstances it might be right or wrong, and what the degrees of error are. We have all had enough cases recently of spurious statistics being quoted by "experts" as to likelihoods and matching, and the consequences of that for families, to know that these things can go horribly wrong. Unless this database is released, it will be impossible to do fundamental research against it as to the accuracy of matching and the circumstances under which a match might be regarded as absolutely valid or doubtful.
	There is no reason why for this purpose it should be associated with any individuals for this purpose. All you need do is provide the biometrics, completely dissociated from any particular person, or indeed dissociated from each other. You would still have just as valid a database for research. It is very important that this tool should be available to the defence because, after all, the prosecution will have it. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: We agree that the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, has raised a very interesting point. I do not think that he suggests that his amendment is perfect in form. He simply tabled it to give us an opportunity to have an interesting debate, which we have had. The noble Lord will know that the provision of anonymised biometric data for research purposes is nothing new. We have done that before. For instance, when the police were developing the Ident1 fingerprint system, they used data from the existing National Automated Fingerprint Identification System to test the technology.
	However, as the noble Lord will know, his amendment would provide no safeguards about who could receive the information without consent, as it does not specify who the information could be supplied to. But we think that there is a way through this. It is foreseeable that the identity cards programme could wish to provide completely anonymised biometric data to research bodies, such as universities or the National Physical Laboratory which has conducted biometric tests for the Home Office in the past. It is only prudent to ensure that our biometric technology remains as secure as possible by keeping up with the latest advances. There is already power under Clause 22 to provide information to public authorities which would allow us to provide anonymised information to our intended research bodies.
	This information would be subject to the specific safeguards provided by Clause 23. Any regulations relating to the provision of such information would be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. So, in response to the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Selsdon, and the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, it is important that we do any research in a very safe and secure way.
	As regards the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Selsdon, on race, colour, creed, social class and so on, the noble Lord knows that they cannot be recorded in the register. So I am afraid that research ambitions in that regard could not be met by anything contained in the register. But there is other information, and the noble Baroness supported it, which we could probably do, and we could do it safely. I hope that we have found a way through to satisfy the noble Baroness because she made a very good point. We looked at the Bill and I am so pleased that we have been able to do so.

The Earl of Northesk: I speak to Amendment No. 219, which would insert the new clause printed on the Marshalled List. As our debates have already revealed, Clauses 11 and 19 to 23 envisage widespread cross-pollination of data between a national identity register and a host of other databases currently in operation across government. Indeed, it is worth noting that the propositions of data sharing and data matching have been a persistent theme of the current Administration. As the Performance and Innovation Unit's publication of 2002—Privacy and Data-Sharing—puts it,
	"The ability of the public sector to deliver high quality services, develop well-targeted policies and ensure efficient government depends on the effective use of knowledge and information—including personal information about citizens (such as health records, tax returns, welfare benefits, law enforcement records, driving licence information, and so on).
	It continues:
	"This requires more joined-up approaches to the use of personal data across organisations".
	Moreover, the statute book is groaning under the weight of successive legislation aimed essentially at creating a more permissive regime for data sharing—as with, for example, the Children Act 2004, which has been translated into the recently announced information sharing index, the Commissioners for Revenue and Customs Act 2005 and the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill.
	In other words, the prevalence of legislative provision in this area is pervasive. I understand the rationale for the data sharing envisaged in the Bill. On the face of it, it could serve at least two potentially beneficial functions: more efficient and effective public service provision and verification of the information held on the register. In the context of the scheme, both of those could be deemed to be desirable although, on the latter, there is the real risk, to which my noble friend Lady Anelay referred earlier: that the national identity register will fall prey to cross-infection of inaccurate and corrupt data from other databases. For example, it was revealed last year that the DVLA data set is only 40 per cent accurate.
	Be that as it may, however attractive the concept of data sharing and whatever its potential benefits—the Government agree with this—it needs to be conducted within the context of human rights and data protection legislation. I again refer to the PIU report. It states:
	"there are signs that public concern about privacy is on the rise—both in the public and private sectors".
	Rightly, the report also states:
	"While there is huge potential to make better use of personal data to deliver benefits to the public . . . this will only be realised if the public trusts the way the public sector handles its personal information—which means meeting their rights and legitimate expectations or the protection of personal privacy".
	According to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Bill does not appear to satisfy that criterion of public trust. Its report states:
	"a number of provisions of the Bill could result in disclosure of information in a way that disproportionately interferes with private life in violation of Article 8".
	In particular, it observes that,
	"the majority of disclosures of information under the Bill are not made subject to the criterion of necessity".
	There is an additional point here. With so much data sloshing between the register and other government databases, there is a distinct possibility that virtual databases could be created. To that extent, it is wholly feasible that the register could have access—not hold, but have access—to sensitive data, as defined by the Data Protection Act. In other words, the Government's sincere intention that the register will not hold such information will not hold such information will, in practice, be pretty much meaningless.
	For my part, I acknowledge that statutory gateways for data sharing and data matching should exist. To echo comments from my noble friend Lord Lucas, we would be unwise to seek to prevent the inevitable. Rather, like my noble friend, I am much more concerned that we get the administrative detail of privacy rights correct.
	Here, in contrast to the drafting in the Bill and the Government's apparent strategic policy in this area, I favour the approach of Liberty. Albeit in a different context but, nevertheless, equally relevant here, it has commented:
	"The starting point for such consideration should be the presumption that each and every measure allowing for information sharing needs to be justified rather than the presumption that information sharing is an unqualified good to which exceptions must be justified".
	That seems to be sensible and appropriate.
	The new clause is intended to address all those concerns. It proposes that the Secretary of State draws up statutory guidelines in respect of the information disclosure provisions of the Bill, with the intention that these be enforceable in law. I have no doubt that the Minister will argue that such a proposition is unnecessary because the Human Rights Act and the Data Protection Act will apply to this Bill in any event. I regret to say that I cannot be quite so sanguine about the matter, nor am I wholly comforted by her responses to previous amendments.
	As I have indicated more than once during our debates, it is wholly feasible that, despite the Government's intentions, sensitive personal data will be accessible from the register, regardless of the provisions of the Data Protection Act. Moreover, there is a great deal of evidence that public authorities across the board are confused about what is and what is not permissible in this area. For example, a current statutory instrument from the DfES—the Education (Information About Individual Pupils) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2005—envisages the retention of named personal data about children for as long as 20 years. It is difficult to see how that can be interpreted as being proportionate within the terms of the Data Protection Act. I apologise for taking some time to explain the new clause, but this is a complex area. Nevertheless, I sincerely believe that this new clause or something like it is necessary as a buttress to the Data Protection Act.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I would hate to disappoint either the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, or the noble Earl, Lord Northesk. If this would change entirely the noble Lord's attitude to the Bill, that is a powerful temptation. But I hope, without succumbing to that temptation, to be able to explain to his satisfaction why the Bill delivers that which the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, seeks, and that both noble Lords will feel better able to support these provisions. I know too that the noble Baroness has tabled Amendment No. 217 because my honourable friends did not have the opportunity to answer her honourable friends when this matter was raised in another place. I will take up her invitation to give as full an answer as I can at a quarter to 10 in order to make sure that she does not feel it necessary to bring the amendment back on Report.
	Clause 23(a) and (b) empower the Secretary of State to make regulations limiting the provision of information to circumstances in which an application has been made, and specifying the persons entitled to make such applications. Subsection (3)(c), which the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness would remove, enables the Secretary of State to impose other requirements as to the manner in which such applications must be made. It is therefore a safeguard which allows the Secretary of State to be more prescriptive about the form applications must take. For example, the power could be used by the Secretary of State to impose regulations stating that these applications must be made in writing. I am sure that the noble Baroness will agree that it would be sensible to use the power in that way to ensure that there is a formal record of any request for provision of information. However, the effect of the amendment would be to remove the power to make such provision. I know from our earlier discussions that the noble Baroness wants such provisions to be available.
	This is a safeguard to ensure that a really rigorous process covering the provision of information without the consent of the individual is in place. The noble Earl, Lord Northesk, and the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, have both emphasised the importance of the administrative process and the need to ensure that it has an appropriately high degree of integrity.
	Amendment No. 218 would preclude the Secretary of State from making regulations that require the person to whom the information is being supplied and/or the applicant for the information, if different, to be approved by the Secretary of State. The power in Clause 24(4)(a) is needed to enable the Secretary of State to set up an accreditation scheme for the approval of persons to whom information may be provided. Again, this is an important safeguard. I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, and the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, have both indicated that they are enthusiastic about an accreditation procedure because it provides the kind of important safeguard that jointly we want to see.
	Noble Lords have queried how information can be provided to someone not specified under Clauses 19 to 22 and how the applicant and recipient may be different. Subsection (5) allows for the provision of information to subordinates of those specified in Clauses 19 to 22. For example, Clause 19(2) allows for provision of information to the Director General of the Serious Organised Crime Agency, while subsection (3) allows for the provision of information to a chief officer of police. There is no need for the Secretary of State to accredit those individuals because they are named in the legislation. But regulations under Clause 23(5) may permit the Director General or the chief officer to authorise subordinates of a particular rank or status to receive information on their behalf. Subsection (4)(a) gives power to make regulations requiring those people to be accredited before information is provided. So that is why the accreditation and the delegation are important.
	Although the applicant for and the recipient of the information will normally be the same person it is possible that they may be different. For example, regulations under subsection (3)(b) may provide that applications for the provision of particularly sensitive information, such as paragraph 9 of Schedule 1 information, may be made only by very senior persons. But that senior person may authorise someone else in his command—for example, the officer in charge of a particular investigation into serious crime—to be provided with the information in accordance with regulations under subsection (5). The purpose of subsection (4)(a) is to ensure that whenever information is provided from the register the request has been made by an appropriate person and the information is given only to an appropriate person.
	Additionally, any regulations made under this clause are subjective to the affirmative resolution procedure. The noble Baroness wanted it; we have given it. This will ensure that Parliament has the chance to have a say on the regulations that will be proposed under this clause. So it all fits together.
	As to Amendment No. 219, I listened carefully to all that the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, said in moving his amendment. I understand the concerns he has expressed. I understand what his amendment is intended to do and the structure that the proposed new clause seeks to put on the face of the Bill, but I hope to persuade him that it is unnecessary. The Bill does not attempt to control what recipients of information can do with it. This is because what is lawful for them to do with it will depend on each recipient's own common law and statutory powers—for example, what the police can do with information received will depend on their common law powers, their powers under PACE and other police legislation.
	The Data Protection Act rights and duties as a data controller will apply to this information in the normal way, as will the Human Rights Act requirements of necessity and proportionality. It would not be appropriate for the Secretary of State to attempt to control or restate these matters in guidance under the Bill. So all of that applies.
	I agree with the noble Earl that both the Information Commissioner and the National Identity Scheme Commissioner will have a strong interest in the uses to which information from the register is put. The Information Commissioner's normal powers under the Data Protection Act apply to the database and to the uses of information from it. There is no attempt in the Bill to restrict, exclude or change them in any way. They remain as strong as they are expressed in the Act. The use made of information from the register is specifically included in the remit of the National Identity Scheme Commissioner by Clause 24(2)(c). We had an opportunity to discuss that earlier in Committee and I hope that I was able to reassure noble Lords in that regard.
	So, with those comprehensive reassurances, I hope the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, will feel she has had the answer deprived her honourable friends in the other place and that the noble Earl, Lord Northesk, and the noble Lord, Lord Crickhowell, will see that the structures we have put together are sound.